Abstract-Secure multi-party computation (MPC) has been established as the de facto paradigm for protecting privacy in distributed computation. Among many secure MPC primitives, Shamir's secret sharing (SSS) has the advantages of having low complexity and information-theoretic security. However, SSS requires multiple honest participants and is susceptible to collusion attacks. In this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of different types of collusion attacks and propose novel mechanisms to deter such attacks in a fully distributed manner. Focusing on outsourced computing environments where secret data owners can collaborate on a public computing platform, we study collusion attacks using game theory. For those attacks where the thefts are detectable, we show that they can be effectively deterred by an explicit retaliation mechanism between data owners. The result is based on a comprehensive analysis that takes into account the cost of collusion, the privacy preference, and the associated uncertainty. For those attacks where the thefts cannot be detected, we expand the analysis to include the computing platform and provide deterrence through deceptive collusion requests as well as a novel cryptographic censorship protocol. The correctness and the privacy of the protocols are proved under the rational adversarial model. Our SSS-based protocols are shown to outperform the state-of-the-art garbled circuit systems, while our simulation results validate the proposed mechanism designs in deterring collusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE goal of privacy protection in distributed computing is to enable distrusting parties participate in joint computation without revealing their secret data. The standard approach to protect the secrecy of data from all parties in a joint computation is to use secure multiparty computation or secure MPC protocols. Despite being actively researched for more than 30 years and significant advancement in the last few years [1] - [3] , secure MPC protocols are still rarely used in practical systems.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2016.2598533 such as those based on homomorphic encryption and garbled circuits, operate on encrypted data and are secure against computationally-bounded adversaries [5] . The long security parameters used in these computationally-secure MPC (CS-MPC) protocols significantly increase the dimension of the ciphertext, rendering such approaches unsuitable for processing short data word (1-4 bytes) that is typical in signal processing applications. Furthermore, the security of CS-MPC systems are constantly being challenged by faster computers and more efficient search algorithms, particularly in the growing area of quantum computation [6] . An alternative is to use information-theoretic secure MPC (ITS-MPC) protocols. In these protocols, information exchanged between different parties are statistically independent of the secret data. As ITS-MPC protocols do not depend on the hardness of specific computational problems, they often admit faster implementations using a smaller finite field for data representations [7] - [9] . Typical baseline protocols for ITS-MPC include linear secret sharing [10] , additive secret sharing [11] , and Shamir's secret sharing (SSS) [12] . SSS is among the earliest and most commonlyused ITS-MPC primitives and has been applied in diverse applications.
A drawback of SSS is the need to ensure that the majority of the computational parties are non-colluding [13] . Researchers have long pointed out the danger of collusion attacks in outsourced computation [14] . These attacks are significant real-life problems and occur in many networked applications. In online Poker and P2P file sharing, cheaters collude to have advantage over other honest players [15] , [16] . PokerStars, one of the the largest online poker cardrooms in the world, recruits special security personnel to manually investigate special play patterns to uncover collusion patterns [15] , and prohibits players from the same country to be in the same game [17] . Colluding communication usually exists in two different forms: they can occur in side-channels external to the protocols, or as hidden data within, otherwise known as subliminal communication [18] . Algorithmically, it is impossible to design protocols to curtail communications over unknown side-channels. Existing anti-collusion techniques focus on eliminating subliminal communication by relying on either a semi-honest/trusted centralized server [18] , [19] or a specially-designed ballot box [20] . These work require heavy computation at a fortified centralized server, which defeats the efficiency goal of using SSS based ITS-MPC techniques.
In this paper, we propose a collusion-deterred outsourced computing platform based on SSS. This platform consists of a set of computing agents that provide computing services for secret-data owners to collaborate on joint computation. Collusion, modeled as a rational adversarial behavior, can occur between one of the data owners and a portion of computing agents, or among the computing agents themselves. Our main contributions are: 1) Different from existing approaches, we model collusion as games and propose various mechanism designs that lead to honesty as stable strategies. The advantage of our approach is that no centralized server or computationally-intensive protocols are needed, making our solutions ideal for high-throughput signal processing applications. Our treatment is also comprehensive because the proposed models can handle different types of collusion attacks including those that may not be detected by the participants. 2) An earlier version of our work has appeared in [7] and [21] . In this paper, we have expanded the analysis to include Bayesian games in modeling the uncertainty in privacy preference and propose a new censorship scheme to thwart collusion among computing agents. 3) In addition, we provide new experimental results to show the efficiency of SSS-based algorithms over state-of-thearts garbled circuit systems. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: related work are first discussed in Section II, followed by a review on outsourcing computation model, secret sharing and game theory in Section III. Section IV presents our collusion attack models. Sections V to VI describe different types of attacks and our game-theoretic countermeasures. We first introduce the User-Vendor game to deter collusion attempts from the secretdata owners. Then, we present the Customer-Agent game to model collusion between the secret-data owners and the computing agents. Finally, we introduce a censorship scheme that eliminates collusive subliminal communications among the computing agents. Experimental and simulation results are presented in Section VII. We conclude the paper with future work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
The study of secure multiparty computation started in the 1980s [22] . There are four main types of secure MPC primitives: Garbled Circuits (GC) [22] , Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [23] , [24] , GMW protocol [25] , and BGW protocol [26] . In recent years, there have been significant advances in optimizing the basic GC protocols [2] , [3] , and in developing novel efficient hybrid circuits [1] , [27] .
Compared with the original plaintext computation circuit, the reliance of public-key protocols in GC significantly increases the size of the encrypted circuit. Alternatively, GMW and BGW protocols use secret sharing schemes such as SSS to protect the secrecy of the operands. While GMW still requires oblivious transfer to protect against malicious adversaries, the BGW protocol is free of any expensive public-key operations and can use any finite field to achieve IT security. It has been used in practical MPC platforms including FairplayMP [28] and Sharemind [11] . The focus of this paper is on building the application framework for the BGW protocol, specifically with SSS building block, for signal processing.
The use of secure MPC in signal processing has a late start due to the substantial challenges in adapting the complex protocols to handle the high data rate and real-time response demanded by typical signal processing applications. One of the earliest projects, SPED (Signal Processing in the Encrypted Domain) and its follow-on research were products of joint efforts between the applied cryptography and signal processing communities, resulting in a number of homomorphic encryption based implementations of fundamental algorithms such as Fourier Transform and filtering [29] , [30] . Recently, efficient SSS-based protocols start to emerge in different signal-processing applications including medical data visualization [31] , image denoising [8] , video surveillance [32] , and outsourced image enhancement [33] .
A key weakness of the BGW protocol is its susceptibility to collusion attacks. In SSS, the secret can be reconstructed using shares from a subset of the computational parties. The smallest size of such a subset is called the threshold of the SSS scheme and it has been shown that the threshold cannot be smaller than half of the total number of parties [26] . A collusion attack occurs when an adversary with malicious intent controls the threshold or more number of parties in a joint computation. In the most general case, when parties are connected by pairwise communication channels, collusion-free protocols for computing non-trivial functions are impossible [19] . For our target application of outsourced computation, we provide a detailed analysis of different collusion attack scenarios in Section IV.
The general problem of collusion occurs in many networking applications from online voting to multiplayer gaming. While our focus is on deterring collusion in SSS-based outsourced computation, there are other work that considered cryptographic countermeasures against the collusion problem. For example, the framework of collusion-preserving computation (CPC) is a general resource used for communications in the multi-party setting [19] . The proposed resource is a centralized server. It provides isolation between parties, meaning that parties cannot communicate directly but through the resource. The resource also provides independent randomness in each invocation of communication. The security parameter of the resource is programmable. The approach of CPC achieves computational security. Thus it cannot be used for SSS-based secure computation. Izmalkov et al. built their anti-collusion scheme on specially-designed verifiably secure devices (VSD) [20] . These computationally secure constructions require heavy computation at a fortified centralized server. The VSD approach does achieve information-theoretic security, but it relies on special hardware like envelope and ballot boxes and and lacks scalability. Thus, it is incompatible with our efficiency goal in applying IT-SMC techniques for high-rate distributed signal processing applications. Previous applications of secret-sharing-based protocols consider the honest-but-curious adversary model without countermeasures against collusions [11] , [34] , [35] . The main challenge of collusion-deterrence in ITS-MPC framework is to maintain the computational efficiency of the SSS protocol after adding countermeasures of anti-collusion.
Our focus on solving collusion attacks in outsourced computation stems from its significant differences from other types of adversarial attacks. General consideration of attacks on secure MPC protocols include two different aspects: 1) how parties are identified and corrupted by an adversary, and 2) how corrupt parties behave under the control of an adversary. For the first question, existing classifications typically focus on whether an honest party becomes corrupted during the course of the computation [36] . For collusion attacks, this question is less important than how a honest party is corrupted by an adversary to collude in stealing a secret -is it due to information received in-band as part of the defined protocol or out-of-band through side channels? The first kind is termed a local adversary attack as it is based on local information anticipated by the protocol. The local adversarial model has been used to model collusion attacks before [37] and will be assumed in our protocol design.
As for the second question, adversarial behaviors are typically classified into semi-honest and malicious. Semi-honest refers to behaviors that do not deviate from the protocols but attempts to extract useful information from received data. The semi-honest model is quite limited in practice -it certainly cannot capture an attempt of a corrupted party to persuade others to collude. The other end of the spectrum is the malicious model which puts no restriction on the behaviors of a corrupted party, which can disrupt and terminate the protocol at any time. Classical feasibility results have already demonstrated that IT security can be achieved by an addition of a broadcast channel and the use of verifiable secret sharing [38] . These additions, however, significantly limit their applications due to a much higher computation complexity.
More importantly, the malicious model does not model colluding activities adequately. First, in the presence of side channels, collusion can occur entirely out-of-band and it is impossible to counter using only protocol design. Second, it does not address the dynamic nature of collusion in which an honest participant agrees or refuses to collude. Assuming that there is a rational being behind each participant, there must be an external reason behind this decision such as a higher reward or a non-negligible probability of getting caught. Such behaviors can be modeled with a rational adversarial model in which a malicious attack can be deterred if the utility of the attack is lower than that of staying honest [39] - [45] .
Fundamental to the protocol design is to address the rationality behind adversarial behaviors. Game theory nicely captures the rationality of adversaries in many commercial, political, and social settings: weighing the gain of cheating against the risk and loss of being caught. The seminal work on rational secret sharing and secure MPC by Halpern and Teague first took into account the rational decision making process of the participants [39] . Since then, there have been several work focusing on various aspects of rational secure MPC including mixed-behavior models [40] , rational ITS-MPC over broadcast channels [41] , and computationally efficient rational secret sharing [42] . Other work attempts to recast the secure MPC problem from a game-theoretic perspective. In [43] , the authors investigated two-party computation in the context of a fail-stop game and extended the notions of privacy, correctness, and fairness through equilibrium definitions from game theory. Recently, rational secret sharing has also been extended to incorporate perfect Bayesian equilibrium to model imperfect designs [45] .
However, the problem addressed by these work is different from ours. These works provide solutions on how to encourage all agents to honestly carry out the computation so that the agents themselves can benefit from knowing the final answers. Such formulation is not suitable for outsourced computation. For outsourcing, the computational agents have no stake on the actual secrets as they are simply carrying out a predefined computation in exchange for some kind of a reward. Also, the active involvement of an agent in a collusion attack does not necessarily disrupt the computational process and the customers can still obtain the correct final results. As a result, our work primarily focuses on the mechanism design to cope with the heterogeneous nature of the games involving both customers and computational agents as well as imperfect knowledge behind their utility functions.
III. BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the general outsourced system used in our work and review key building blocks, including Shamir's Secret Sharing and basic game theoretic mechanisms used in our protocols.
A. Outsourced Computation
Our computing framework comprises of two types of participants: the computing platform agents and the platform customers, i.e. the secret-data owners. Denote any pair of platform customers as U and V who want to cooperate in a joint computation. We focus our discussions on two parties but the scheme is general enough for arbitrary number of parties. U and V do not trust each other with their secret data and they do not possess the necessary resources for the computation. As such, they outsource their computation to the computing platform by means of the SSS protocols.
At the heart of any SSS protocols is the assumption of the availability of multiple computing agents. Compared with other encrypted-domain techniques, SSS is particularly suitable for protecting privacy in distributed signal processing because it is information-theoretic secure and does not require computation in large integer field. We denote a computing agent in the computing platform as A i where i ∈ {1, 2, . . .}. To coordinate different agents, we assume that there is a coordinator C who is responsible for keeping records of the IDs of participants but does not handle any actual secret data. Note that U and V do not trust A i 's and C with their data either. Details of the adversarial model for A i 's and C will be discussed in Section IV.
Despite its simplicity, this computational framework is an abstraction of many practical scenarios. For example, in the context of cloud computing, A i provides platform as a service (PaaS) while U can be a user with sensitive data and V is a proprietary software vendor providing software as a service (SaaS) [46] . It is also important to note that our emphasis is on protecting privacy of data, rather than the programming instructions. In general, we assume that U and V are fully aware of the intention and flow of the program as they need to prepare their data in the appropriate form. The actual program is carried out at each of the agents A i . However, A i has access only to encrypted data so the actual program it is executing could be obfuscated to hide data communication patterns that might reveal important information about the data. More discussions on this issue can be found in Section IV-A.
B. Shamir's Secret Sharing
SSS protects privacy by decomposing a secret into input shares. It is information theoretic secure: an adversary has no knowledge of the secret at all regardless of its computing power if the number of input shares it obtained does not satisfy the pre-defined access structure of the underlying sharing scheme [47] . For the (t, n)-SSS scheme where n is the number of computing agents and t < n is a designed parameter called threshold, the access structure is for any entity holding at least t shares.
Assume that there are n computing agents and U has a private input x from a finite field F m , where m is a prime. U hides x as the constant term of a random (t − 1)-degree polynomial, and generates n shares, [x] t i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, by evaluating the polynomial at i :
where α j 's are uniformly random numbers known only to U . The secret x can be reconstructed with t or more shares using the Lagrangian interpolation:
where γ i j ∈K , j =i − j i− j and K is any subset of {1, . . . , n} with at least t elements.
SSS is homomorphic in addition, scaling (by a known factor) and multiplication, which are universal in building any arithmetic circuit [26] . Specifically, both addition x + y and scaling cx by a known constant c can be realized directly by locally applying the same operations on the shares at agent i :
Multiplication can also be realized in shares but the resulting polynomial has a higher degree of 2t − 2:
Notice that the degree of the product polynomial increases to 2t − 2. Thus, the threshold for reconstruction will also increase to 2t − 1, requiring almost twice as many shares, or equivalently agents, to reconstruct the product. There are two solutions to this problem: the first solution is to increase the number of parties n to guarantee that n is large enough to accommodate all multiplication operations. The second solution is to apply a "renormalization" procedure to reduce the threshold back to t [13] : each agent breaks its product share into n separate shares, and sends one share to each of the corresponding agents. The final share at each agent is computed as a weighted summation of these newly received shares from other agents as shown below:
It can be shown that the renormalization process is information-theoretic secure [13] .
C. Game Theory and Secure MPC
Game theory provides the mathematical foundation to analyze situations where two or more participants or players make rational decisions that influence one another's welfare. The interactions may include both conflict and cooperation. There are many categories of games in the literature. In our work, we adopt strategic form games to model collusion attacks as non-cooperative games. Game-theoretic concepts used in our framework are strategic form game, Nash Equilibrium (NE), dominant strategy equilibrium (DSE), Bayesian Game, and evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). The notations and the concepts are summarized in the Appendix and we refer readers to the excellent coverage of the topics in [48] and [49] for details.
Central to using game-theoretical techniques in analyzing MPC protocols is the notion of security against rational adversaries. The definition of security against rational adversaries is as follows and is an extended version based on [44] :
Definition 1: A MPC protocol is robust against t-rational adversaries if (a) each adversary controls t or fewer nonoverlapping players, and (b) the honest strategy (i.e. faithfully following the protocol) is the Nash Equilibrium for all adversaries regardless of the inputs from the remaining honest players.
In Definition 1, we use the term "robust" rather than "secure" as it does not preclude the leakage of secret information through the exchange of messages within the protocol. As a consequence, our security analysis will first focus on identifying the existence of Nash Equilibrium for different collusion attacks modeled as strategic form games. Once we can ascertain the conditions for Nash Equilibrium, the adversary can be assumed to faithfully follow the protocol. Any explicit information exchanged within the protocol can then be further analyzed based on the classical security approach using semihonest adversarial model.
IV. COLLUSION ATTACK MODELS
Unlike two-party garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption, SSS-based protocols are prone to collusion attacks. We now describe the different types of collusion attacks that can occur under the SSS-based outsourced computation framework. We will continue to use the same notations as defined in Sections III-A and III-B.
A. A1: Side-Channels Among Agents for Collusion
If an adversary controls t or more computing agents involved in the computation, they can exchange their secret shares freely through their pre-established side channels to reconstruct the secret numbers x and y. As the communication through the side channels is independent from the information exchanged within the protocol, such attacks cannot be detected within the protocol and must be tackled at the architecture level. One possible approach to deter such kinds of attacks is by obfuscating the computing task to make it difficult for an adversary to identify the computing agents involved in a specific task and determine their functions. The exact approach will depend on the infrastructure behind the computing platform P. We consider two scenarios:
(i) P2P: P is formed by amassing a large number of independent computing agents on the internet that contribute their CPU cycles in exchange for small payments. To deter an adversary from identifying the set of agents involved in a task, we can rely on the coordinator C to randomly assign agents to a task. C is assumed to be trusted with keeping the mapping secret. Since C is not involved in the actual computation, the additional measure required to secure C should not significantly affect the scalability of the platform. Such a hybrid approach of mixing computation/communication peers with coordinators are common among peer-to-peer systems [50] . The use of anonymity network protocols such as Tor [51] can also prevent the formation of the side channels and force the communication to the assigned communication channels.
(ii) Enterprise Cloud: P is centrally managed by an enterprise system. The solution is to obfuscate the computation process so that different agents on the same cloud would not be able to recognize that their processes are originated from the same task. All identifiable information, such as IP addresses of the user and vendor, must be obfuscated while dummy instructions and data should be added to mask the traffic pattern [52] .
The detailed implementation of these approaches are system oriented and beyond the scope of our work. In the sequel, we will assume that no such side channels exist among agents and model the adversaries as localized, i.e. restricted to the assigned communication channels [37] .
B. A2: Collusion Between Agents and U or V
We will focus on the agents' collusion with U , as the case for V is identical. As each agent possesses secret shares from both U and V , it is possible for U to collude with t or more agents to reconstruct y from V . No changes in infrastructure can block such an attack as it is necessary for U to privately communicate with the agents. To deter such an attack, we propose a retaliation mechanism such that a heavy penalty can be levied on U if V can provide convincing evidence of the leakage of his/her secret through U . In Section V, we study the choice to collude or to stay honest under retaliation as a game between U and V . We show that being honest is the solution, provided that there exists effective tools to collect evidence of theft.
On the other hand, it is not always possible to collect any evidence or it may be too costly to go through with the retaliation process. To cope with such an "undetectable" theft, we observe that enough number of agents must be involved in a collusion attack for it to be successful. Thus, collusion can be deterred by having undercover police officers disguised as corrupted users/vendors in catching colluding agents. In Section V-B, we formulate such an interaction as an evolutionary game and show that if there are enough number of police officers, being honest is indeed a NE for the agents.
C. A3: Collusion Attack by Computing Agents
The direct communication among agents is essential as it is needed in the renormalization procedure and the reconstruction of necessary intermediate values. On the other hand, it opens doors for them to collude. The difference between A1 and A3 is that the communication is localized as the coalition of agents in A3 forms after the random assignment of agents to U and V . As such, it is possible for U and V to thwart this collusion by inspecting the communication among agents. Note that the communications among agents consists of random secret shares so it is challenging to identify if they actually contain subliminal data for collusion. Also, uncontrolled examination by U (or V ) may reveal information about the original secret data from other parties. In Section VI, we propose a censorship scheme in which U and V collect the data from each agent and randomize them before sending them back to the agents. Subliminal communication becomes impossible due to the injection of random noise known only to U and V .
V. COLLUSION DETERRENCE GAMES
In this section, we use game-theoretic techniques to model A2 collusion attacks as described in Section IV. Collusion attacks A2 refer to the collusion formed between the agents and either U or V to steal the other's secret. In Section V-A, we first study the strategy of either U or V to participate in a collusion attack to steal the other's secret in a game called User-Vendor Game. In Section V-B, we consider the influence of the agents and propose countermeasures in a game called Customer-Agent Game.
A. User-Vendor Game
We assume that, before starting the joint computation, there exists a legal-bounding contract in place so that U and V both understand that they should not collude with agents in stealing each other's secret. This contract would stipulate that if one party, say V , finds out that U tried to steal V 's secret, U would be liable to pay for the damages based on charges brought on by V . In retaliation, U could countercharge V with similar accusations. The judgement in resolving such a conflict would need to be carried out by proper authority, possibly after a long proceeding in evaluating the legitimacy of evidence provided by both parties. We call this strategy undertaken by U and V retaliation.
With the initial strategy of staying honest or cheating and the follow-up strategy of possible retaliation, there are four possible combinations for each player or a total of 16 different interaction outcomes between both of them. All possible cases are listed in Table I with C U , C V = 1 represent cheating and R U , R V = 1 represent retaliation.
Among the different combinations, there are cases that we believe are unlikely. We mark these unlikely cases with outcome X based on the an-eye-for-an-eye assumption: if one party retaliates by filing charges for a suspected cheating offense, the other party will retaliate with a counter-lawsuit. This simplistic world-view is based on the fact that a player must be made aware of the retaliation action from the other and the only rational reaction to protect oneself is to countersue. This is also supported in real life by the large number of litigation, especially in the United States, from simple smallclaim charges to multinational patent infringement lawsuits between companies. Based on this assumption, case 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14 and 15 from Table I are excluded. For the remaining cases, the goal is to investigate the preference of different outcomes in order to derive the optimal strategies. We group the remaining cases into five possible classes of outcomes from A through E. Case 4, 8, 12 and 16 all involve mutual retaliation with outcomes ultimately decided by an external entity (court). Since the process is likely to be long, tedious and highly uncertain, we make the assumption that any case with mutual retaliation always results in the least desirable outcome and collectively label these outcomes A. The assumption that retaliation is undesirable does not imply that cheater can ignore such a possibility. Rather, it means that both players will either avoid this outcome by staying honest or retaliate if the evidence against the other is overwhelming and the value of the secret is higher than the cost of retaliation. The decision to retaliate is at the heart of our mechanism design.
The remaining four outcomes do not involve any retaliation, which means that the computation completes successfully and each party gets rewarded for carrying out his/her task. To study the preference ranking of these outcomes, we assume the perspective of U because the case for V is identical. To consider possible preference orders, we first use a cost and benefit analysis to eliminate unlikely orders and then analyze the remaining ones using different games to study the equilibrium strategies.
From the perspective of U , a rational judgement on the preference would based on the relative values between the two secrets and the additional cost associated with cheating. While U clearly knows the value of his secret, his estimate of V 's secret is imprecise. In addition, the value of the secret depends on whether the secret holder decides to collude and cheat -it is unlikely that a cheater will put forth a genuine secret in the joint computation. The cost of cheating would include additional cost to get the majority of the computing agents into a collusion.
While outcome A is the least desirable, outcome C is the most desirable because U also successfully steals V 's secret and suffers no consequence. As V is honest, V 's secret should be of high enough value to cover U 's cost in collusion if this collusion attack is a rational act. All the other outcomes are not as good: outcome D represents the case when U is honest without any additional gain, though it is the socially optimal behavior; outcome E represents the case when U is honest and suffers a loss as his secret was stolen by V ; outcome B represents the case when both U and V cheat and steal each other's secret. Note that for this case V 's secret may not be of high enough value to cover U 's cost because V cheats. While it is clear that outcome D should be ranked higher than E, it is unclear where outcome B should be. In summary, there are three preference orders we need to consider:
where the symbol denotes "is preferred over". The three preference orders differ in the ranking of outcome B. A useful way to understand these orders are based on the cost of collusion. The first order (7) ranks B the lowest because the high cost of collusion exceeds even the damage of losing one's own secret in E. On the other hand, the last order (9) implies that the collusion cost is lower that the gain of stealing the secret from the dishonest V and results in a net gain for U . From the viewpoint of mechanism design, it is intuitive to make collusion cost as high as possible for deterrence, which will be the subject of Sections V-B and VI. In the remaining of this section, we study how retaliation impacts the strategies of honesty versus cheating for different preference orders.
1) Symmetric Games:
In this subsection, we study the initial strategy of staying honest versus cheating under possible retaliation, assuming that all the players have the same preference order. The follow-on strategy of retaliation involves complicated factors including the detection of collusion attacks and the availability of evidence in support of retaliation. Due to the difficulty in modeling the payoff utility for retaliation, we instead model it as a parameter q and study its relationship with other factors. Specifically, we define q as the "nonretaliate" probability for both U and V , conditioned on the other's cheating behavior. The extreme value q = 1 means that no one retaliates while q = 0 means that one always retaliates if his/her secret is stolen. A useful alternative interpretation of q is to view it as the normalized reward for cheating, which is only worthwhile if the cheater can get away with Table I ) -we believe that this is an extremely unlikely situation considering that retaliation is the most undesirable outcome.
As we have five outcomes to consider, we denote the normalized utility values for these outcomes as 0 = p 0 < p 1 < p 2 < p 3 < p 4 = 1. For the three preference orders corresponding to high collusion cost (7), medium collusion cost (8) to low collusion cost (9) , the mappings of the utility values to the three cases are shown in Table II .
Each of the three assignments can form a two-player, two-strategy symmetric strategic form game. There are many possible solutions to such games. In this section, we consider their solutions under Nash Equilibrium and derive the conditions that lead to honesty being the stable strategy for both players. Detailed proofs of the theorems can be found in the Appendix. (9) . Theorem 1 can be interpreted as follows: it can be shown that ( p 3 , p 3 , p 2 ) represents the payoff values for both players being honest with the preference orders (7), (8) and (9) respectively. On the other hand, one can show that the average payoff of a successful cheating, i.e. one player cheating without any retaliation, is q for all three orders. Thus, the strict inequality in all three orders implies that honesty is stable if both players being honest has strictly higher payoff than the successful stealing of other's secret. Theorem 1 is important because making p 3 high by providing and paying for high-quality services, and providing state-of-the-art theft tracking technology such as watermarking to make q small are both reasonable mechanisms in maintaining a viable market. There are situations when thefts of secret are hard to prove because the stolen secret is never resold, but merely provides knowledge to the thief. Such an undetectable theft makes it difficult to keep q small. Additional mechanisms to tackle such scenarios will be described in Section V-B.
As the payoffs are real values, all the equality cases are of marginal interest. However, due to the symmetric nature of the game, the conditions become important if cheating behavior is already rampant: 
for (9). (Cheat, cheat) is not a Nash Equilibrium for (7).
For (8) and (9), qp 2 and qp 3 respectively represent the average payoff of mutual theft while p 1 represents the payoff of both players losing their secrets. Thus, cheating is a NE if mutual theft has strictly higher utility than losing one's secret. If the two utilities are equal, cheating is still a NE if a successful theft has higher utility than both being honest. For a poorly developed and managed market, it is quite possible that the majority of the population has already engaged in dishonest behaviors. Theorem 2 shows that it is very difficult to turn things around because the condition to maintain the cheating behaviors is easily satisfied: the sole reason of the existence of a marketplace in providing privacy-preserving computation is that the participants value the privacy of their data. This means that losing those data can cause significant harm and p 1 must be very small. Despite efforts of making q small, the low to medium costs of collusion could keep p 3 for (8) or p 2 for (9) significantly higher than p 1 . There are two lessons to be learned from the point of view of mechanism design: first, it is important to maintain honesty as majority by growing the initial market with substantial subsidy. Second, additional mechanisms are required to make collusion harder and they will be discussed in Sections V-B and VI.
Finally, when none of the above conditions are met, as in the case when the value of a secret cannot be a-priori determined, there could be a robust fraction of cheating behaviors in the population based on the following corollary.
Corollary 1: If none of the conditions in Theorems 1 and 2 are met, the NE is a mixed strategy.
2) Bayesian Games: In the previous section, we assume both players share the same preference order. This assumption enables us to use relatively straightforward analysis to compute the Nash Equilibrium. However, in many situations, customers U and V may not be able to tell the other player's preference. The preference order of a player may change depending on the secret data used in the computation. A player opened to the possibly of cheating may also adopt a different preference order, and mostly certainly wants to keep this information private. Such unknown private information of the opponent can be viewed as the opponent's type used in the Bayesian game as described in Section III. In this section, we analyze all possible Bayesian Games between U and V derived from our framework from the perspective of U . There are a total of three Bayesian Games according to U 's three different possible preference orders. Instead of Nash Equilibrium, the analysis will focus on strongly dominant equilibrium introduced in Definition 4 as it is independent of the prior belief of the opponent's type. Recall that 0 = p 0 < p 1 < p 2 < p 3 < p 4 = 1 stand for the five different utilities for the five outcomes in a specific preference order, we obtained the following results:
Theorem 3: Under the Bayesian User-Vendor game, the conditions for honesty to be a strongly dominant strategy for a player are
These conditions hold regardless of the player's preference order. Compared with the symmetric case in Theorem 1, we can see that the Bayesian result is dominated by the conditions for the preference order (9) . The reason is that this preference order represents the lowest collusion cost and the conditions of a strongly dominant strategy must satisfy the worst case scenario. Once again, the key to deterring collusion is to keep q as low as possible, i.e. making detection of a theft highly robust. However, as pointed out earlier, some collusion attacks may not be detectable at all and as such, retaliation mechanism alone is insufficient. Thus, we have designed further mechanisms to reinforce the anti-collusion efforts, which are described in the following sections. Finally, we skip the Bayesian analysis for cheating as a dominant strategy because it is very similar but of less interest in building a sustainable market.
B. Customer-Agent Game
For U to be successful in stealing V 's secret, U must be able to convince t or more agents to collude with him. A collusion attack can thus be avoided if the agents refuse to collude. Such a collusion avoidance tactic is highly desirable as it does not rely on after-the-fact retaliation that hinges on the detection of the theft. To deter agents from colluding with customers, we introduce honest undercover customers (police) that attempt to collude with agents. A cheating agent who is reported by either a police customer or a honest customer will be paid nothing and banned from the system. This worst outcome is denoted by v 0 . Let λ be the conditional probability of encountering police given a colluding request from the customer. For the case when there is no colluding request from the customer, the conditional probability of encountering police is zero as the undercover police is supposed to tempt agents with deceptive requests. The payoff matrix for the customer-agent game is given in Table III. The normalized payoffs are represented as 0 = v 0 < v 1 < v 2 = 1, and are assumed, for simplicity, to be the same for both user and agents. (honest, honest) is clearly a NE of this game. In fact, honesty becomes a strongly dominant strategy for the agent if v 1 > 1−λ. This is the most desirable outcome, brought on by a large λ or a significant presence of police. On the other hand, v 1 ≤ 1−λ will make (cheat, cheat) another NE of the game. Such an unfortunate situation will occur when there are not enough police or the payoff for an honest agent is significantly smaller than that of collusion. The use of deceptive strategies to track dishonest agents is common in real life. In network security, honeypot servers are routinely used to decoy network attacks towards a well-isolated and monitored area so as to collect information that may lead to ultimate apprehension of the attackers. In fact, game theory has been routinely used in analyzing the strategic use and placement of honeypots [54] . Some researchers have argued that only a small number of honeypot servers at network core can thwart most network attacks [55] . This points to the interesting possibility of incorporating network topology into our agent-based secure MPC framework to further reduce the number of police customers, a subject worthy of further investigation.
VI. CENSORSHIP
The analysis in Section V focuses on strategies to promote honest behavior among users. However, even if all the users are honest, the computing agents themselves can collude to steal secrets as illustrated by the A3 attack scenario in Section IV. During reconstruction or renormalization, agents are supposed to exchange information with each other. Unlike the A1 attacks, agents do not have any pre-existing side-channels and as such, they might try to collude by sending subliminal messages within the protocol. A trivial solution is to simply prohibit communication among agents. This solution works for only simple computation protocols in which renormalization is not necessary. Verifiable secret sharing [56] does not work for renormalization either, as the dishonest agent has the freedom in setting a few semantically meaningful new shares (say to its IP address) while maintaining perfect reconstruction of its original share.
In this section, we propose a simple censorship scheme to delegate the task of renormalization to a more "trusted" entity. With the properly designed game-based mechanisms as described in Section V, we assume that the customers U and V are deterred from colluding with the agents and use the semi-honest model for their possible adversarial behaviors. However, they still have a strong incentive to safeguard their secrets and keep all of the agents honest. As such, U (or V ) can carry out the task of renormalization by injecting fresh noise into the shares to destroy any subliminal messages. The proposed censorship scheme requires processing and routing messages of agents through U (or V ). Suppose that the underlying protocol is the (t, n)-SSS in a finite field F m where n is the number of computing agents, t is the original threshold of the SSS, and m is a prime. The censorship scheme is described in Protocol 1.
Before presenting the security proof, we discuss the complexity of this protocol. Our protocol has 4n invocations of communication in each renormalization compared to n(n − 1) in the original SSS. The reduction in the number of invocations (for n > 5) is due to the fact that the centralization of the responsibility to U enables multiple messages to the same agents be combined in Step 5.
A. Security Proof
We first prove the correctness of Protocol (1). In step 4, the equation
Thus, the polynomials used to share r U and r V can be considered to have degree p with leading terms zero so the additive homomorphism holds. In step 5, U carries out the renormalization step to reduce the degree of the polynomial back to t − 1. In step 6, the first term reconstructs the noisy share based on the renormalization formula (6):
Then, using additive homomorphism, A i obtains
, which is the desired output of renormalization.
Next, we prove the security of Protocol (1). We first define the security model based on the following assumptions:
1) Semi-honest U and V : All the conditions for the honest strategies of U and V being the Nash equilibrium in both the User-Vendor and Customer-Agent games are satisfied. 2) Local Adversarial Model: A rational adversary A may control up to t−1 agents at the beginning of the protocol. 3) Adversarial Behaviors: We limit the adversarial behaviors of A to four types: abort (a), honest (h), cheat (c), random (r). "Abort" represents early termination. "Honest" means following the protocol while "cheat" implies purposefully changing inputs to gain additional information. "Random" covers the remaining behaviors that arbitrarily modify the agents' outgoing messages. We denote the corresponding distributions of all outgoing messages as D a , D h , D c , and D r . 4) While Protocol (1) has no output for U and V , it is intended as part of a more complex procedure that delivers an output for U and V . We assume that U and V have mechanisms to check the correctness of that final output, which will determine the reward for the agents. 5) Utility: Let U be the utility function of A. We assume the following ranking:
Assumption 1 implies semi-honest behaviors for both U and V according to Definition 1. Assumption 2 limits the capability of A: as all the secrets are represented in either (t, n)-SSS or ( p, n)-SSS with p > t, A cannot steal the secrets unless it can collude with additional agents via the communication channels established within the protocol. The last three assumptions define the rational behaviors of A. The utility ranking (11) stems from our assumption that, instead of having ulterior motives such as hactivism or terrorism, A is reward driven and will not adopt any action resulting in inaccurate final results that may lead to U and V withholding rewards for the agents. D a and D r are two examples of such actions, which lead to lower utility than D h . 1 D c also produces inaccurate results and our proof focuses on the worst case scenario where the benefit of cheating exceeds the rewards from U and V . While a successful cheating requires at least one originallyhonest agent becoming rogue, it turns out that we do not need to consider any multi-player cheating game as there is no way A can send any useful information to honest agents.
Theorem 4: Based on the security model defined above, Protocol (1) is robust against (t − 1)-rational adversaries among all the agents based on Definition 1.
Proof: Let A be any t − 1-rational adversary. As A controls only t − 1 agents, it will try to lure at least one other agent, say A j , by replacing the output messages to U in step 4 with alternative messages m j i from A-controlled agents A j i . In step 5, U transforms each m j i into n secret shares and sends one share [m j i ] t j per message to A j . Regardless of any correlation among different m j i messages, SSS guarantees that any single share from each message is uniformly random and independent from each other. As such, any information by A intended for A j is eliminated and cheating is impossible. As such, a rational A will choose honesty to maximize its utility based on Assumption 5.
After we show that all participants of Protocol (1) are semihonest, we can follow the classical simulator paradigm and demonstrate that all messages exchanged in the protocol do not leak private information [57] .
Theorem 5: Protocol (1) is information-theoretically secure against a semi-honest U , a semi-honest V , and any semihonest adversary A controlling t − 1 or fewer agents.
Proof: The simulation paradigm stipulates that a protocol is secure if all messages exchanged are statistically indistinguishable from those generated by a simulator S using the inputs from the adversary and the outputs for the adversary produced by the ideal model of the underlying function. The ideal model for renormalization is straightforward: a trusted oracle takes in original secret shares from each A i , renormalizes them, and sends them back to A i . U and V are not involved. In Protocol (1), V does not receive any messages so the protocol's security against V is trivially satisfied.
, . . . , n} so it is possible for U to reconstruct u + r U + r V mod m, and consequently u + r V mod m as U knows r U .
However for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} in step 5. All these messages are secret shares from a (t, n)-SSS scheme, which guarantees information-theoretic security for any semi-honest adversary controlling t − 1 or fewer agents.
VII. EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we first compare the computation efficiency between our Collusion-Deterred SSS (CD-SSS) and state-ofthe-arts garbled-circuit techniques. Then, we simulate how different strategies might evolve under different conditions in the user-vendor games and the customer-agent game.
A. Computational Efficiency of CD-SSS Versus GC
We first test the hypothesis that our CD-SSS system provides a more computationally-efficient secure MPC system than other state-of-the-arts GC implementations, including both TASTY [58] and ObliVM [1] . The choice of TASTY and ObliVM is based on their performance and the availability of software. GC is primarily a 2-party secure MPC scheme while our CD-SSS system requires at least 3 agents and 2 customers, user and vendor. As the extra computing resources are not used for parallelization but rather for matching the security access structure, we measure the performance based on the actual wall clock time needed to complete the entire computation and network transmission. For the benchmark operations, we have chosen addition, multiplication, and comparison of two encrypted numbers. For our CD-SSS system, we assume that the input numbers are already in shares and the operations complete with a reconstruction. The implementations of addition and multiplication are straightforward and based on the GNU MP library [59] . While we only use one-level deep multiplication, we have included a renormalization step so that the number is representative for arbitrary number of levels.
Comparison is more complicated and our algorithm is based on [8] . Here we briefly review the procedure. Suppose v and w are two l-bit numbers to be compared and we rely on the radix-2 representations of the numbers. So the bits of v and w are denoted as v i and w i for i = 0, 1, . . . , l − 1. The computation is performed bit by bit from the most significant bit. All the bits are already in shares and the share computation is performed in In the proposed CD-SSS, the user or vendor are responsible for renormalization and reconstructions as discussed in Section VI, while the agents perform all the remaining computation. We adopt a number of strategies to expedite the calculations. First, all shared random numbers are pre-generated and distributed among the agents. Second, as communication and synchronization are needed after each operation, we amortize the measurements over a large number of operations so as to minimize the communication overhead. To promote reproducible research, we have made our CD-SSS implementation publicly available at our website. The experiments were run in two different testbeds. The first testbed is on a virtual 1-Gbps LAN with up to 5 Linux nodes (1G Hz Dual-Core AMD Opteron with 2GB RAM) on Deterlab [60] . The available TASTY software is unable to support comparison on such a wide operand. Table IV shows that CD-SSS is 2 to 3 orders of magnitude faster than the two other GC methods. We also notice that our measurements for ObliVM are significantly slower than the ones reported in the original paper. As such, we attempt to normalize the platform by running CD-SSS on Amazon EC2 computing nodes of types c4.8xlarge, the same computation platform used in ObliVM. The results of ObliVM are directly copied from their original paper [1] . The results are summarized in Table V . For CD-SSS, the speeds for both addition and multiplication are slightly slower that those from Deterlab as their time measurements are dominated by the networking component. We speculate that the virtual network provided within a Deterlab experiment has far less traffic than the Amazon cloud. On the other hand, comparison requires more complex local computation and enjoys a 3X speedup using the faster CPUs. Overall, CD-SSS still performs 1-2 order of magnitude better than ObliVM.
B. Simulations of Strategic Behaviors
In this section, we validate the conditions of different games studied in Section V. Instead of Nash Equilibrium (NE), we focus our experiments on simulating the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). While these two solution concepts are based on different conditions, ESS, if exists, must coincide with NE. Also, we believe that this is an appropriate approach because, for the distributed computing platform to be economically viable, it will need to have a large number of customers. Among the customers, those that provide proprietary software services are likely to be reviewed by their clients and dishonest behaviors can result in poor customer ratings, leading to their ultimate demise. Typical consumers who want computing services on their private information will need to use their credit cards to pay for the services. Again, any suspected cheating behaviors can ruin their credit scores. In other words, while we model cheating versus staying honest as rational behaviors, bad behaviors on a highly-social, well-connected distributed computing marketplace can affect the decisions of other players. As such, we use EGT to model the population of all the customers in this marketplace that are seeking and providing privacy-protected computing services. In our simulation, we use the replicator dynamic (RD) to simulate the evolution from a given population profile under different conditions. Our implementations are based on the GameBug simulator [61] .
We first illustrate how the system evolves over time for different User-Vendor Games. Each user in the system is randomly matched with a vendor from the same population for cooperations. Recall that q is the non-retaliation probability and p i is the i -th ranked payoff. At the beginning of the simulation, we assume 90% population to be honest. We first test the scenario of preference ranking (7), with p 3 ≥ q. The initial population profile evolves very quickly toward the purehonesty ESS as depicted in the top graph of Fig. 1 . In sharp contrast, p 3 < q leads to a mixed ESS with h u = h v = 0.8 as shown in the bottom graph of Fig. 1 . Second, we test the scenario using preference ranking (8) . Under the condition p 3 > q, the honest strategy prevails quickly as depicted in the top part of Fig. 2 . Under the alternative honest condition p 3 = q and p 1 > qp 2 , the honest behavior evolves very slowly as depicted in the middle graph of Fig. 2 . Condition qp 2 > p 1 lead to the population evolve to cheating, as depicted in the bottom graph of Fig. 2 . Third, we simulate preference order (9) . The honest condition p 2 > q yields a relatively slow system evolution compared to the previous two games, and the condition p 1 > qp 3 and p 2 = q has a even much slower evolution, as depicted in the top and the middle graphs of Fig. 3 respectively. The cheating condition qp 3 > p 1 behaves similarity to order (2) as depicted in the bottom part of Fig. 3 .
The Bayesian Game when U is with preference order (7) is illustrated in Figure 4 under the condition p 3 > q. The initial population is divided 50% against 50%, each playing "H" and "C". The belief probabilities are set as r = s = t = 1/3. They can be set arbitrarily and do not much affect the result. The system evolves quickly to honest. Finally, we simulate the Customer-Agent Game. Consider the case when v 1 > 1 − λ. Setting 50% of the users and agents as honest initially, Fig. 5 shows that agents evolve to honesty while users stay at a mixed strategy over time as predicted by the non-strict NE. Second, for the case of v 1 < 1 − λ, Fig. 6 shows that the same initial population composition of half cheating and half honest is gradually taken over by cheating which is a NE.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an outsourced distributed computation framework on secret data based on Shamir's secret sharing. The key innovation is a comprehensive modeling of different collusion attacks and countermeasures using game-theoretic approaches. Two types of games, user-vendor and customer-agent, have been studied. User-vendor games model the intention to commit collusion attacks with the possibility of retaliation from the perspective of a customer. Using both symmetric strategic form games and Bayesian games to model uncertainty in privacy preference, we have concluded that honesty is a stable strategy if it is possible to reliably detect thefts, thereby keeping the cost of collusion high. For undetectable theft, we have proposed a deception design to inject police customers into the framework. Using the customer-agent game, we have concluded that honesty is a stable strategy for agents under a significant presence of police. A cryptographic censorship protocol has also been proposed to sanitize traffic so as to eliminate any collusion among agents under a covert adversarial model. Experimental results have been provided to demonstrate the efficiency of our proposed system over state-of-the-arts Garbled Circuit systems and the validity of our game-theoretic constructions. To extend current work, we will design social computing experiments to confirm the proposed mechanisms accurately reflect practical outsourced computing. Another important area of extension is to incorporate suitable network topology of agents into the framework. Our preliminary studies used a network of agents in reducing customers' load in the censorship protocol [62] . Further extension of network design could potentially relax conditions for honesty strategy.
APPENDIX

A. Game Theory Concepts
Definition 2: A strategic form game Γ is defined as a tuple  N, (S i ) i∈N , (u i ) i∈N , where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of players, S i is the strategy set of player i , and u i : S 1 ×· · ·× S n → R for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are mappings called the utility functions or payoff functions.
In game theory, players are assumed to be interested in maximizing his/her utility. A celebrated solution concept is the Nash Equilibrium. We describe the two-player case here.
Definition 3: A Nash Equilibrium (NE) for two player games is a pair of strategies (s
Another solution concept is the Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE). We present the strong sense of dominance here:
Definition 4: In a n-person game, a strategy profile
It is easy to see that any (strongly) DSE is also a NE but the converse is not true. The conditions for DSE are very strong and many games do not even have a DSE. On the other hand, NE always exists in a finite game [48] .
In a distributed systems, agents usually have additional private information that affects their decision making. For example, in secure MPC, each user may value their secrets differently that can affect his/her behavior. When players have their private information about the game that other players do not know, the game can be analyzed using the Bayesian Game theory.
Definition 5: A Bayesian Game Γ is defined as a tuple
• N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a finite set of players.
• Θ i is the set of private information, or types, of player i
• The probability function α i specifies a probability distribution α i (.|θ i ) over the set Θ −i . It represents the belief of player i on the types of other players, denoted as Θ −i , if his/her own type is θ i .
• u i : Θ × S → R for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are utility functions. The solution concepts of NE and DSE can be easily extended to Bayesian games [49] . The computation of Bayesian NE depends on the knowledge of the prior belief functions α i , which can be difficult to obtain in many practical applications. As such, it is generally preferable to use DSE to analyze Bayesian games as their analysis do not require the belief functions [63] .
To study large distributed systems, we need to map game theoretic analysis to a population of similar players playing the same strategic form game with different strategies over a (7) period of time. The framework to analyze such games is called the Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT). The analogous concept to NE in EGT is the possible existence of an evolutionary endpoint of adopting a specific strategy s * , called the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS). Given a 2-player strategic form game on a population, we define a population profile x such that x(s) for s ∈ S denotes the fraction of the population playing s. To consider if a particular strategy s * is evolutionary stable, we specialize the notation x ε to mean x(s * ) = 1 − ε and s =s * x(s) = ε for ε ∈ [0, 1]. The second term is typically referred to as the mutant population. Then, we have the following definition of ESS:
Definition 6: The strategy s * is an evolutionary stable strategy or ESS if there exists an ε such that for every 0 < ε < ε and u(s * , x ε ) > u(s, x ε ), ∀s ∈ S \ {s * } where u(s,
In other words, u(s, x ε ) denotes the average payoff of a new player entering the population playing strategy s against a random player from population profile x ε . As this new player is more likely to choose s * , the mutant population will diminish, further strengthening the condition in the definition. Another core concept in EGT is the evolutionary game dynamics, which describes how the population profile changes over time based on the fitness of each strategy [64] . The most common approach to model the dynamics is through a set of replicator equations for each strategy in the form of
where x is the population profile. Equation (12) describes a simple exponential growth model. This is generally applicable to autonomous agent systems where there is inertia in staying with the same strategy and the rate of change of the population using a particular strategy depends on the difference between the utility of that strategy and the average utility.
B. Proofs of Theorems 1, 2, and Corollary 1 1) Preference Order (7):
We first consider the case of C D E B A. The normal form game can be described by the payoff matrix described in Table VI. The two-tuple in each entry indicates the average payoffs of U and V when adopting the row and column strategies respectively. In the context of a population game, cheating would be a NE if (a) q 2 p 1 > qp 2 or (b) q 2 p 1 = qp 2 and q > p 3 . As 0 ≤ p 1 , q ≤ 1, neither conditions are valid and cheating can never be a NE. Honesty would be a NE (9) if (c) p 3 > q or (d) p 3 = q and qp 2 > q 2 p 1 . As qp 2 > q 2 p 1 is always true, we have the following conclusion: Honesty is a NE for both U and V if p 3 ≥ q. When the theft is undetectable, i.e. p 3 < q, it can be shown that the following mixed strategy constitutes a NE:
where h u and h v are the honest fraction of U and V respectively. Unfortunately, this situation will undoubtedly occur in real life. It is thus important to incorporate additional mechanisms to deter cheating behaviors.
2) Preference Order (8):
In this subsection we examine the case of C D B E A. Actually we need to examine only the interpretation of B E, as others remain the same. The motivation behind such an order is that U now gets extra information -the secret of V -in outcome "B" than in outcome "E", although in both cases U loses his/her own secret. The payoff matrix is described in Table VII .
To make the honest strategy a NE, we must have either (a) p 3 > q, or (b) p 3 = q and qp 1 3 . While the equality constraints may be hard to achieve in real-life but condition (c) is possible with a high enough q. Thus, cheating is still possible. If none of the above conditions are satisfied, the NE is a mixed strategy with the honest fraction as follows:
3) Preference Order (9) : In this subsection we examine the case of C B D E A. With B D, we have the situation that both cheating is preferred over both being honest. The payoff matrix is shown in Table VIII .
To make the honest strategy a NE, either (a) p 2 > q, or (b) p 2 = q and qp 1 > q 2 p 3 , i.e. p 1 > qp 3 = p 2 p 3 , 3 . Note that conditions (b) and (d) are the same except that (b) requires p 2 = q which is difficult to sustain, so the situation is that both populations of honesty and cheating coexist. The honest fraction is expressed in the general solution:
C. Proof of Theorem 3
Let us denote preferences (7), (8) , and (9) as x, y, and, z in this section. Denote Θ U as the private type of player U . The private type in our framework is the choice of one's preference order.
1) U Has Type Θ U = x: First, suppose the type of U is Θ U = x. V 's type set is Θ V = {x, y, z} and U needs to guess a priori how likely each type of V will be. Given U 's own type Θ U = x, denote U 's belief probabilities over V 's possible types as α(x|x) = r , α(y|x) = s, and α(z|x) = 1 − r − s = t, where 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 1. The utility functions for Bayesian Games when U has type x are defined by three type games, formulated in Tables IX, X, XI. They represent interactions between Θ U = x and Θ V = x, Θ U = x and Θ V = y, and Θ U = x and Θ V = z, respectively.
The utilities for U are denoted as U U,Θ U =x (S U ; S V ). It is the total expected utility for U under his/her type x when 
where u U (x, x; H, H ) means the utility for U in the type game Θ U = x against Θ V = x, when the matching strategies are (H, H ). Similarly, we can proceed to calculate all utilities for the Bayesian Games of Θ U = x, summarized in Table XII. The solution concept used is the strong dominant strategy equilibrium, introduced in Definition 4. This solution results in a stable choice of strategy of one player regardless of what the other player chooses to play. Specifically for our UserVendor Bayesian Games, the ideal strong dominant strategy would be staying honest, or U U,Θ U (H ; S V ) > U U,Θ U (C; S V ) for all possible S V .
Recall 0 ≤ r, s ≤ 1, t = 1−r −s, and 0 = p 0 < p 1 < p 2 < p 3 < p 4 = 1. To achieve the goal of making the pure honest strategy dominant, the condition would be to have p 3 > q. This can be verified by comparing the utilities of the two strategies, "H" and "C", for U under all possible opponent strategy profiles in the two columns in Table XII .
Analogously, we can find conditions for the honest strategy under U 's two remaining Bayesian Games when U 's types are y and z. We skip the analysis for types y and z as it is similar to that for type x. Full details can be found in [53] .
In conclusion, for all three possible types of U and all possible strategy profiles of V , the conditions for honesty to be dominant are
It can be simplified as
